Abstract: Employment rights may be crafted as 'bright-line' rules or open-textured standards. Employment rights which are framed at a higher level of generality, such as standards, have not been examined in the same level of detail as rules in labour law scholarship. Standards can be divided into standards of conduct and standards of review.
INTRODUCTION
This paper seeks to examine the nature and structure of legal commands which confer employment rights in the field of labour law. To that extent, it is engaged in a descriptive exposition of, and normative discourse about, the nature and structure of labour laws. In pursuing this line of inquiry, the paper adopts a basic distinction between employment rights which are expressed as rules and those which are articulated as standards.
1 Existing labour law scholarship has principally engaged with the significance of legal commands articulated as rules which confer employment rights. 2 However, this paper marches along an altogether different path, seeking to plug a gap in the existing labour law literature by focusing on employment rights which are crafted as open-textured legal standards. An employment right which is articulated as a standard may be described as a juridical command to an employer which draws out the law's expectations about acceptable managerial behaviour at a high level of generality.
In examining standards, a distinction is made in this paper between standards of conduct and standards of review. Standards of conduct are directed at employers and delineate the nature of the behaviour which the law anticipates from employers and against which employers may internally test their conduct and decision making. Meanwhile, standards of review represent the external level of scrutiny of managerial decision making and conduct which the law expects from adjudicators and so are addressed to such enforcement authorities. The significance of the distinction between standards of conduct and review lies in the fact that it represents another means of measuring the normative force of laws and filling out their meaning. The perspective adopted in this paper is that laws conferring employment rights which are drawn as standards are characterised by an internal drift.
Indeed, it is submitted that the intensity of scrutiny which is attached by a legislator or judge to an employment right expressed as a standard tells us something about the strength of (1) the fundamental values or particular policy preferences underpinning that particular right and (2) the right itself: the greater the deference to management allocated to the standard, the less significance the legislature or adjudicator (ie the law maker who was responsible for the promulgation of the right) would appear to attach to that right and the inherent policy issues or fundamental values which inform its scope and substance. Once this has been understood, it is an insight which affords us another yardstick against which employment rights can be measured. For example, there is a general assumption that in adjudicating disputes involving employment rights, the judiciary is overly deferential to the managerial prerogative 3 and this assumption can be corroborated -but also challenged -by an analysis which focuses on standards of review quite separately from standards of conduct. Such an examination reveals situations in which the level of scrutiny exerted externally by the adjudicator pursuant to the standard of review may be less, but also more, acute than that attached to the internal standard of conduct.
This paper is split into the following parts. Parts 1, 2, 3 and 4 articulate the differences between standards of conduct and review, and explore how the intensity of scrutiny attached to standards of conduct and review are forged. Parts 5 and 6 then go on to identify examples of divergence between standards of conduct and review from the field of labour law and the rationales in favour of such a divide. Finally, in parts 7 and 8, a basic normative structure or metric is erected against which the arguments in this paper can be given greater clarity and meaning. The final part concludes.
OF RULES AND STANDARDS
The aim of this section is twofold: first, to say a little about the defining criteria of rules and standards in the field of labour law as a means of differentiating between the two; secondly,
to address briefly what standards reveal about the character of employment laws. 4 It is trite to state that one of the key functions of labour law is to strike a balance between management and the labour force, or 'to support and to restrain the power of management and the power of organised labour'. 5 At the heart of the employment relationship lies the managerial prerogative. A consequence of the exercise of managerial autonomy is that the employer will take a whole range of decisions having positive and adverse implications for employees and their interests. Given the potential for abuse arising from the untrammelled application of the managerial prerogative, the common law and Parliament have intervened in specific contexts and at different times to introduce laws to police the behaviour of employers by conferring rights in favour of employees. Such laws establishing employment rights may manifest themselves as (1) rules or (2) standards. 6 Rules occasionally impose strict liability on employers. Regulations Regulations 1998 duly expressed in terms of a standard might be a legal command that all employers must ensure that their employees take an adequate and appropriate amount of leave in any successive annual period. The legal command expressed as a standard is thus less precise in nature in comparison with the rule amounting to a tangible differential in formal substantive terms. 7 Words and phrases such as 'reasonable', 'proportionate', 'rational', 'due care', 'equitable', 'adequate' and 'appropriate' are examples of classic standard-like language. 8 The purpose of making the categorical distinction between rules and standards in this paper is essentially geared towards the adoption of an organising framework. This framework enables us to move on to a consideration of the issues which influence the nature of standards, and the identification and rationalisation of the elements which shape the level of intensity of scrutiny of managerial action (duly exerted internally by employers and externally by an adjudicator) pursuant to the application of such standards. Furthermore, inherent within the acknowledgment of the existence of standards is the recognition that the normative force of certain employment rights cannot be conceptualised as static or fixed.
Rather, that those rights possess an intrinsic capacity to drift in terms of their force of application once instantiated within a particular fact-dependent context. This insight encourages us to engage in a more nuanced dialogue about standards and to divide them into two separate camps which are mutually exclusive, yet interdependent. That is to say, that standards may be segregated into standards of conduct and standards of review. This distinction is particularly important since it presupposes that the strength of standards may drift and vacillate in terms of intensities of scrutiny.
OF STANDARDS OF CONDUCT AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Standards may be divided into 'standards of conduct' and 'standards of review'. What is the distinction between them? Is it a positivistic, source-based distinction in the sense that standards of conduct are, by necessity, promulgated by the legislature with the standard of review duly handed down by an adjudicator (or vice versa), or is the threshold criteria predicated on the object of the instruction, ie the legal person to whom the standard is addressed? In order to answer this question, one is required to consult existing scholarship in the area of corporate law: 9 'A standard of conduct states how an actor should conduct a given activity or play a given role. A standard of review states the test a court should apply when it reviews an actor's conduct to determine whether to impose liability or grant injunctive relief.'
In the labour law context of legal commands conferring employment rights, standards of conduct are directed at employers, whereas standards of review are addressed to the tribunals and courts. 10 Thus, the source of the standard is not the distinguishing criteria and so it is perfectly possible for (1) standards of review to be set by the legislature or selfgenerated by subsequent modification by an adjudicator or (2) standards of conduct to be promulgated by an adjudicator, eg where the common law 'creates' a new right which is expressed as a standard.
Standards of conduct prescribe 'conduct rules' and guide employers on how they ought to act in a given situation. It is more common for such standards of conduct to be crafted by the legislature than an adjudicator. For example, in terms of a statutory provision, an employment right may be expressed as a standard of conduct to the effect that all employers must ensure that their employees take an adequate and appropriate amount of leave in any successive annual period. The internal actions and decision making of employers are thus guided when they are engaged in fixing the annual leave requirements of their employees by reference to an 'adequate and appropriate' standard of conduct. An example is the command to employers in s 4A(1) of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (DDA) 11 to make 'reasonable' adjustments to the workplace in order to accommodate their disabled employees.
Meanwhile, standards of review prescribe 'decision rules' and determine how an adjudicator ought to analyse externally the decisions or actions of the employer to whom the standard of conduct was addressed. 12 In contrast with standards of conduct, standards of review are directed towards adjudicators. The common law of the contract of employment prescribes an implied term that an employer's decision to award (or not award) discretionary bonuses or benefits must not be made irrationally, perversely or contrary to good faith. 13 Here, in terms of the standard of review, the command to an adjudicator is to apply a rationality standard and so adjudicators must assess whether an employer's decision and actions were rational and bona fides.
In order to give the contours of the standard of review more substance, one can build on the 
FIXING THE STANDARD OF CONDUCT
The basic premise of part 2 above is that standards of conduct and standards of review can be evaluated in terms of the internal and external scrutiny which they exert over a particular 
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Whilst such an approach is attractive, there are particular difficulties which must be overcome. First, one of the drawbacks of applying such an approach which focuses on a particular employment right in isolation is that it perhaps serves to cloud our ability to view employment rights in the round. If the standards of conduct associated with different employment rights vary in levels of intensity due to the nature of the fundamental values which underpin each right, from a perspective which sees labour law as an autonomous body of law (to which those rights analysed duly belong), issues of internal coherence are somewhat elided. In other words, in diverse contexts, and sometimes in the same context, employers are enjoined to scrutinise internally their actions and decision making according to diverse standards which vary in the degree of scrutiny of managerial action. This is a fundamental point to which the writer will turn in greater detail in a future article. A more obvious difficulty is that any normative framework which seeks to fix a standard of conduct on this basis must itself first establish a wholly separate framework regarding a hierarchy of employment rights in terms of some being more fundamental than others -and this would be gauged with reference to the level of significance of the underpinning values and objectives. 19 The difficulty with such an endeavour is that it is an inherently subjective pursuit which is value-laden in nature. Hence, an alternative way of approaching the normative significance of standards is to turn matters on their head and to argue that the intensity of scrutiny which is attached to a right tells us something about how fundamental a legislature or adjudicator (ie the law maker responsible for promulgating the standard and the associated employment right) considers the values underpinning that particular right to be.
To articulate this point in another way, if one were to chart the standards of conduct attached to employment rights presently existing in the field of labour law, there would be some correlation between the extent of the internal deference to the employer associated with the selected standard and the significance with which the law would appear to treat the right and the latent values which influence its content and scope of application. 20 In terms of such a framework, one can begin to understand the level of importance which a system of labour law attaches to particular employment rights. Pursuing this point a little further, it also means that a selected number of employment rights can be scrutinised with a hierarchy of intensity of standards of conduct identified in terms of those rights, which, in turn, enables the significance or relative strength of such employment rights to be charted against a reliable metric or spectrum. assess whether such period of leave is justifiable, having regard to the legitimate business aims and needs of the employer'. In such an example, the notion of a distinction between the standard of conduct and the standard of review assumes great practical relevance. If the employer sought to resist liability by demonstrating to an adjudicator that the period of leave was 'adequate and appropriate', it would be missing the point. Although the employer is internally directed to consider the adequacy and appropriateness of the period which it has set, the intensity of scrutiny to be applied externally by the adjudicator represents a particularly diluted version of the intensity of the standard of conduct which is addressed towards the employer. The instruction to the adjudicator to take into account (1) the financial position of the employer and (2) the justifiability of the period of leave fixed by the employer in light of the employer's commercial interests, imports particularly subjective factors into the adjudicator's assessment, ie consideration of what is reasonable for the employer in the instant factual setting rather than what is reasonable according to the mores of society at large or the court or tribunal itself. Thus, what is 'adequate and appropriate' in the circumstances is not to be analysed on a purely objective basis which would entitle the adjudicator to be more intrusive in its scrutiny. Instead, the standard of review points the adjudicator towards a mixed subjective and objective examination of the period of leave from the perspective of the employer, amounting to an approach which is more forgiving of the employer. Thus, the standard of conduct and standard of review may in theory diverge and the introduction of a more deferential standard of review is merely another technique available to the law to dilute or lighten normative controls imposed upon management.
Of course, one might argue that no such divergence in practical terms exists, ie that the distinction (1) has no application in practice in the field of labour law and so by necessity must be uninteresting or unsound and/or (2) is redundant. There are a number of possible rationales for the adoption of such a position. First, that since it is difficult to identify specific circumstances in which the standards of conduct and review diverge, the distinction should be cast aside. In part 5 below, this paper will draw out compelling examples from the field of labour law which serve to underscore the presence of the distinction. A second objection to the soundness of the distinction is related to the approach of the gatekeepers of the law, namely the legal practitioners or other professional advisers who communicate the intensity of the standards to employers. Solicitors and barristers may well opt to take the safest strategy available by advising management on the basis of the higher of the standard of conduct or standard of review in terms of the level of scrutiny of managerial action. In other words, the argument runs that the manner in which the intensities of scrutiny of the standards of conduct and review are communicated renders the distinction meaningless in theory and practice. However, it is submitted that the nature by which the standards are communicated to management does not mean that the messages which the law transmits to management and the adjudicator in separate strands are not distinct. Instead, it merely dictates that the means and methods by which these standards are expressed to management may on occasion be undertaken by advisers with the better part of caution. A third possible reason for arguing that there is no such distinction is that adjudicators are simply engaged in a process of interpreting the standard which is set down in the particular source of law, whether it be common law or statute. If the adjudicator adopts or applies what appears to be a different standard from that which appears to have been suggested by the common law or the wording of the relevant legislation, this does not necessarily signify the presence of two distinctive standards. Rather, there is a simpler explanation and that is that the process is purely indicative of statutory or legal interpretation in operation. Whilst this is a compelling argument, the examples selected from the field of labour law, and considered below in part 5, will demonstrate that something more than an interpretative process is being pursued where there is evidence to suggest that standards of conduct and standards of review diverge. Indeed, that adjudicators are engaged in something much more profound than a process of construction.
EXAMPLES OF DIVERGENCE BETWEEN THE STANDARDS OF CONDUCT AND REVIEW IN LABOUR LAW
As a means of demonstrating that adjudicators are engaging in more than mere interpretation in forging a distinction between standards of conduct and standards of review, it is beneficial to take some real live examples from the field of labour law. self-generated modification of the standard of review by an adjudicator. It channels the adjudicator towards a consideration of the band of responses which a reasonable employer might take in the face of the particular actions or omissions of the employee. Importantly, the 'range' test deprives the court or tribunal of a free hand to substitute its own judgment for that of the employer or to articulate what ought to have been done by the employer by reference to its own standards or the mores of society at large. Instead, it entails the application of a mixture of objective and subjective considerations: objective to the extent that the tribunal or court must identify how different reasonable employers might react to the employee's actions or omissions; yet, subjective 27 in (1) a 'weak' form in the sense that s 98(4) of the ERA enjoins the tribunal or court to take into account subjective criteria, such as the size and administrative resources of the employer, thus enjoining the adjudicator to afford 'some allowance not only for external facts, but also for personal characteristics of the actor himself' 28 and (2) in a 'strong' sense to the extent that, by adopting internal practices and formal, written procedures and policies which underscore the particular economic interests of the organisation, there is clearly scope for the employer to channel the parameters of an adjudicator's evaluation of the employer's decision making and conduct towards a more lenient subjective assessment.
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A further example of the divergence between the standard of conduct and review in labour law is provided by s 3A(1) and (3) of the DDA. 30 Section 3A(1) of the DDA articulates the standard of conduct which the legislature expects of an employer of disabled persons in the context of the concept of 'disability-related discrimination'. The command to the employer in s 3A(1) of the DDA is that it must not without justification treat a disabled person for a reason which relates to his disability any less favourably than it treats or would treat others to whom the reason does not or would not apply. For the purposes of evaluating whether the employer has advanced a valid justification for treating the disabled employee less favourably than others, the legislature stipulates in s 3A(3) of the DDA that an adjudicator must adopt a standard of review which seeks to assess whether the employer's reason for the treatment was 'both material to the circumstances of the particular case and substantial'.
If theemployer fails to show material and substantial reasons for such less favourable treatment, it will be deemed to have committed 'disability-related discrimination' and will be held liable. On the face of it, language such as 'the circumstances of the particular case'
suggests that the material and substantial reasons factor would involve the adjudicator applying an objective measure of scrutiny of the employer's actions and reasoning for the less favourable treatment. In that way, the adjudicator would be entitled to form its own opinion as to how it would have acted or decided matters and then substitute its own judgment for that of the employer as to what constituted 'material and substantial reasons'. It is submitted that the rationales for the articulation of such a distinction in the case of unfair dismissal and disability-related discrimination are demonstrative of something more symbolic than a process of construction. But, in what way?
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR DIVERGENCE
A number of rationales for divergence between standards of conduct and review have been propounded in the existing literature. For example, Eisenberg argues for bounded rationality as a rationale for divergence in terms of which the standard of review is set at a less intensive degree of scrutiny than the standard of conduct. 33 Here, the underlying notion is that there is a differential in legal knowledge between an employer and an adjudicator.
Whilst an adjudicator will be instructed by counsel in the detailed aspects of employment law (or will be aware of the body of employment law as an experienced and qualified lawyer), an employer will labour under limited knowledge and will invariably decide how to act on the basis of incomplete information. Moreover, as a normative proposition, employers should not be expected to understand the entire body of employment law or consult legal practitioners before making decisions: the costs associated with such endeavours would be prohibitive to the employer. In such circumstances, Eisenberg argues that 'the legal messages which are primarily directed to [employers]-that is, standards of conduct -should be simple, so that they can be effectively communicated'. 34 Thus, the argument from simplicity/complexity provides explanatory force for a distinction between the intensity of scrutiny attached to the standard of conduct and standard of review.
Furthermore, in the context of the law of directors' duties in American corporate law, Allen, Jacobs and Strine have argued that divorcing the standard of conduct from the standard of review will be appropriate in certain factual contexts. 35 Allen, Jacobs and Strine argue that divorcing the standard of conduct from the standard of review, with the latter being set at a more lenient (from the perspective of the employer) level than the former, will be appropriate in two particular circumstances, which themselves tend to overlap to some degree: first, where (1) it is clear that more than one decision may be appropriate in response to a given set of circumstances; or, secondly, where (2) it is difficult for adjudicators to differentiate between 'bad' decisions taken by the employer from 'good' decisions taken by an employer which turn out 'badly'. 36 In some circumstances, eg where the law has to decide whether a person's actions were negligent in tort, it is common that only one decision is 'good', so that decisions which turn out to have harmful effects will usually amount to bad decisions; however, in other contexts, the assessment of a person's decision making may not be so straightforward, particularly where there is an expectation that it will be part of the decisionmaking process to take commercial risks. In circumstances where (1) and (2) exist, the divergence in the standard of conduct and standard of review is simply a matter of 'practical fairness' to the decision maker, resulting in a 'zone of protection'.
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To confer greater clarity on the meaning of factor (2) above, consider the example of an employer who decides to expand its business by opening a new store and employing five employees. The venture is initially successful generating healthy returns, but ultimately, 6
years later, the store is closed with the loss of the five jobs. With the benefit of hindsight, it is tempting for an adjudicator to come to the view that the decision to expand the business was a 'bad' decision, that it was pre-ordained to result in the redundancies and that each of the economic dismissals were unfair in terms of ss 95 and 98 of the ERA. However, such a rationalisation of the position may be misguided, since it fails to countenance the possibility that the resolution of the employer to expand may have been a 'good' decision which, for faultless reasons, simply turned out badly. Here, the 'hindsight bias' phenomenon comes into play. That is to say that when adjudicators evaluate the past decisions of third parties with the knowledge of how things actually turned out, as a matter of behavioural psychology they will inevitably overestimate the likelihood of the actual outcome at the time the decision was made by that third party. 38 The danger is that what was in fact a 'good' decision which turned out badly could be misclassified as a 'bad' decision ab initio. For that reason, a finding that the dismissals of the five employees were unfair would be misguided.
Applying the insights of Allen, Jacobs and Strine to the example of unfair dismissal in labour law, it could be argued that, in the context of disciplinary proceedings initiated by an employer against an employee for reasons of misconduct, capacity, etc, 39 more than one decision may be reasonable or appropriate. One of the reasonable decisions may be dismissal, another to give the employee a final written warning, another to give the employee a second written warning, etc. 40 Thus, in terms of Allen, Jacobs and Strine's approach, on the grounds of being realistic and 'practically fair' to the decision maker, the judiciary are Another argument put forward by Allen, Jacobs and Strine is that a divergence between the standard of conduct and the standard of review is justified where there is a role for the pursuit of legitimate policy preferences. 41 Therefore, the standard of review to be applied to determine whether an employer should be found liable ought to be reflective of substantive reasonable may be judged according to a subjective standard of review which is particularly lenient. According to such a prescription, the employer would be deemed to have discharged its duty to make reasonable adjustments if the adjudicator was satisfied that the employer itself had a genuine belief (1) that its conduct was reasonable or lawful, (2) that it had complied with the duty or (3) that the reason for its conduct was reasonable or lawful. An alternative would be to apply the 'range of reasonable responses' standard. In terms of such a formulation, the employer would be deemed to have failed to discharge its duty to make reasonable adjustments if the court or tribunal had identified a band or range of responses which a reasonable employer would have taken and the decisions or actions taken, or sanctions adopted, by the employer did not feature on the list of reasonable responses identified by the court or tribunal. Whilst not as lenient as the first subjective standard of reasonableness, the range of reasonable responses standard is indeed relatively forgiving.
However, it is the third possibility which has been adopted by the judiciary as the applicable
standard of review. This is amply demonstrated by Collins v Royal National Theatre Board
Ltd. 49 and the judgment of Kay LJ in Smith v Churchills Stairlifts plc. 50 Here it was ruled that the appropriate standard of review was one of objective reasonableness. An objective standard enjoins a more intrusive degree of intervention than the other two possibilities, since, as articulated above, the adjudicator has the right to substitute its own judgment for that of the employer by reference to a hypothetical reasonable employer. The selection of the objective reasonableness standard of review tells us a significant amount about the level of importance which adjudicators afford to the employment right. It also fits with our understanding of the philosophy which lies at the heart of the duty to make reasonable adjustments in the DDA. The duty to make reasonable adjustments is concerned with the encouragement of positive discrimination, ie substantive equality, in favour of disabled employees and the collective goal behind the policy initiative is to increase the number of disabled persons in the workplace. In Archibald v Fife Council, Baroness Hale of Richmond recognised 'that the [duty to make reasonable adjustments in the DDA] entails a measure of positive discrimination, in the sense that employers are required to take steps to help disabled people which they are not required to take for others'.
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Whilst it is useful to consider the circumstances in which a departure of the standard of review from the standard of conduct is justified, it is also worthwhile to pause for a moment to ask what the value in the distinction between the two standards is in more abstract terms.
Here, it is submitted that, at a conceptual level, the courts are engaged in something more than a simple process of interpretation. Instead, implicit in the recognition of the distinction is the realisation that employers and adjudicators possess differing levels of knowledge about the employer's general managerial practices and behaviour, including the circumstances surrounding and influencing any managerial decision which an adjudicator may be required to evaluate. It is more often than not the case that there will be a knowledge deficit on the part of the adjudicator regarding the commercial environment of the employer. Thus the adjudicator will labour under an informational deficit in the sense that they are privy to imperfect information. In such circumstances, the distinction between the standard of conduct and the standard of review or the modification of the standard of review possesses practical force, since there is merit in the law prescribing differing intensities of scrutiny to both standards lest the law wishes to subject itself to the charge that it lacks legitimacy.
Moreover, the importance of the distinction between the two standards lies in its correlation to the conception of law as an instrument which possesses symbolical value in its own right, in the sense that the law is more than simply a coercive tool and functions to communicate authoritative moral guidance about the manner in which employers ought to behave and exercise the managerial prerogative. In such a way, the law articulates the expectations which it has of the employer via the standard of conduct, and the message which the law sends to the employer is morally and politically charged. Of course, there may well be dissonance between that message and the message which is communicated to the adjudicator via the standard of review, which itself contains a moral component. But the utility in the distinction between the two standards in that scenario lies not so much in the way that it coerces or enjoins the employer and adjudicator to comply with the standard, than in the symbolic value attached to the different messages which are sent to the recipients. Instead, an adjudicator is empowered to substitute its own judgment for that of the employer by reference to a hypothetical reasonable employer, the characteristics of which it has a free hand to craft. the employer to achieve a legitimate aim or objective. 57 In each case, the strength of the requirement of the employer to achieve the legitimate aim and the harm caused to the employee will vary in depth and, thus, so will the intensity of scrutiny of managerial action.
However, there are two particular ways in which the proportionality standard can be contrasted with the range test. First, proportionality is two-dimensional in the sense that an adjudicator must evaluate the harm caused to the employer and the aims and objectives of the employer. This can be contrasted with the range of reasonable responses test which is one-dimensional in its focus, since it generally ignores the effect of the employer's decision on the employee 58 and instead concentrates on the practices of the employer and reasonable employers generally. Secondly, it is submitted that the proportionality standard is more intrusive in its scrutiny than the range test on the basis that the former commands the adjudicator to engage in value judgments about the desirability and legitimacy of the exercise of the employer's prerogative by requiring engagement with the practices and policies of the employer and to direct that they be altered or removed if need be. 63 show, this reasoning is arguably unsound.
A NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The level of scrutiny of managerial action attached to a standard of review enables us to appreciate the degree of importance which the judiciary allocates to a particular employment right, including the inherent values, 'practical fairness' pointers and policy issues. To that extent, the general antipathetic judicial attitude to the interests of labour can be laid bare.
With this in mind, one ought to take tentative steps towards constructing a normative framework by which such an hypothesis can be given greater clarity and strength. This can be achieved by painting a picture in terms of a spectrum against which intensities of scrutiny attached to standards can be charted.
It is submitted that substance to the notion of varying intensities of scrutiny attached to standards can be afforded by adopting and constructing a single reliable metric. The most effective metric is to chart standards in terms of the level of interference which they internally (by the employer itself) or externally (by an adjudicator) exert over the managerial prerogative, ie the degree to which managerial action is called to account internally or externally by that standard. For example, a rationality standard -which is essentially the same as the Wednesbury 64 unreasonableness standard in public law 65 and posits that liability will only fall upon an employer where no rational employer would have made the decision taken -is not particularly intrusive. It is clear that a rationality standard is not as interfering from the viewpoint of the employer than a proportionality standard which (as argued above) enjoins an adjudicator to evaluate the desirability and legitimacy of the practices and policies of the employer. In such circumstances, since the engagement with the employer's managerial prerogative in the case of the rationality standard is comparatively limited, we can conclude that rationality entails a more limited form of policing of the decisions and actions of employers than the proportionality standard and is thus less intensive in terms of the scrutiny involved.
Of course, matters are complicated by the fact that standards may be fixed (eg rationality standards, subjective reasonableness and objective reasonableness standards) or floating, ie variable (eg the range of reasonable responses and proportionality standards). One might argue that it is impracticable to compare fixed standards against variable standards in terms of relative intensity of scrutiny for the reason that their diverse natures renders such a comparative exercise meaningless. However, it is argued that it is possible, at the very least, to identify a 'baseline', which is representative of a minimum level of scrutiny associated with the floating standard and which increases proportionately with (1) the subjective characteristics of the employer, in the case of the range test, or (2) the degree of harm suffered by the claimant employee, in the case of the proportionality standard.
Equipped with this spectrum or metric against which standards may be plotted, it is possible to evaluate a legislature's and an adjudicator's attitude to employment rights. In terms of the hypothesis advanced above, where the fundamental values, practical fairness issues or policy goals associated with an employment right are deemed by a legislature or adjudicator to be extremely important, one would expect to see the intensity of scrutiny attached to the standards of conduct and review inclined more towards an objective reasonableness or proportionality standard. Conversely, standards of conduct and review will be pitched at a rationality, subjective reasonableness or range of reasonable responses threshold, where employment rights are deemed by the legislature or adjudicators to be comparatively less significant or worthy of more limited protection. In such a way, employment rights expressed as standards can be benchmarked against the factors which influence the manner in which they are articulated.
CONCLUSION
The formulation advanced in this paper enables a researcher to examine differing employment rights and build up a hierarchy of standards, which, in turn, enables the significance or relative strength of those employment rights to be charted against a spectrum ranging from 'extremely significant' to 'not significant'. A transparent mechanism is thus designed in terms of which it is possible to unearth the generally deferential judicial attitude to the managerial prerogative in the adjudication of disputes involving employment rights, which labour lawyers rightly perceive to be a pervasive phenomenon. This perspective is suggestive of an in-built natural drift or movement in standards which is an observational point, ie that secondary agents such as adjudicators may (1) provide some latitude to actors to whom a standard of conduct is addressed or (2) intervene to render the level of scrutiny harsher. Indeed, the marking out of this dynamic is another means of acknowledging the incontrovertible proposition that the judiciary are engaged in the development of legal policy in the labour law field. The examination of standards of conduct independently from standards of review and vice versa is useful inasmuch as it functions to reveal situations in which the level of scrutiny exerted externally by the adjudicator pursuant to the standard of review may be less, but also more, acute than that attached to the internal standard of conduct.
However, from the perspective of a philosophy which places great value on the internal intelligibility and doctrinal coherence of a system of rules, principles and standards in an autonomous area of law such as labour law, conceivably, there could be difficulties caused by standards of conduct and review which are attached to differing employment rights being pitched at differing levels of intensity. The presence of differing intensities of scrutiny of the managerial function in the context of different employment rights can be attacked on the basis that labour law lacks coherence and is internally contradictory as an independent discipline. The point here becomes particularly acute where one conducts a descriptive examination of the law governing the regulation of the employment relationship as it currently stands in UK law. It soon becomes clear that there are a number of standards or approaches to the internal and external scrutiny of the exercise of the managerial prerogative. The intensity of these standards of review can be classified within a hierarchy, with each set exerting greater or lesser control over the employer's freedom of autonomy in terms of the normative framework established in this paper. It is submitted that future research can reveal the extent of those difficulties, which will be exposed and explored in another paper. 
4.
On the basis that there is a rich body of academic literature dedicated to the task, it is not proposed to explore the circumstances in which it may be more appropriate to draw an employment right in terms of a standard rather than a rule. ' (19751976) 89 Harvard Law Review 1685 at 1687. The basic idea is that it may be more efficient and less costly for a rule maker to frame the employment right in terms of an open-ended standard and defer the evaluation of liability to an adjudicator in particular cases which emerge in the future. A standard affords a law maker the luxury of avoiding the upfront expenditure of resources by devolving responsibility for dispute resolution to adjudicators to ascertain whether an employer has infringed the standard, or not, as the case may be.
